



Enforcing Privacy in Online Services

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

Paris P2P Festival
09/01/2020

Who am I?

- Head of the distributed systems & information retrieval group @LIRIS lab, Lyon, France
 - liris.cnrs.fr/drim
- Research topics
 - Distributed systems
 - Fault-tolerance
 - Performance
 - *Privacy*



Today's Distributed Systems



An example: Web Search

Every day, millions of users are querying **SEARCH ENGINES**

We also use this information [*that we collect from all of our services*] to offer you tailored content – like giving you more **relevant search results** and **ads**.


<http://www.google.com/policies/privacy/>



USER PROFILES




Web Search: Privacy Threats



Retrieve user's identity

- numb fingers
- 60 single men
- dog that urinates on everything
- Landscapers in Lilburn, Ga,



User ID
4417749

Barbaro, Michael, Tom Zeller, and Saul Hansell. "A face is exposed for AOL searcher no. 4417749." *New York Times* 9.2008 (2006): 8For.

Web Search: Privacy Threats




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


a 62-year-old widow who lives in Lilburn, Ga., and loves her three dogs.

Thelma Arnold

Barbaro, Michael, Tom Zeller, and Saul Hansell. "A face is exposed for AOL searcher no. 4417749." New York Times 9.2008 (2006): 8For.

Web Search: Privacy Threats




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Thelma Arnold

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Infer extra information

Age

Zip Code

Religion

Gender




Diseases

Interests


Jones, Rosie, et al. "I know what you did last summer: query logs and user privacy." Proceedings of the sixteenth ACM conference on Conference on information and knowledge management. ACM, 2007.




Another Example: Video Streaming






Streaming over CDNs



Streaming with DASH





Still...





Live stream temporarily unavailable



Multi-Source Streaming



Privacy issues






Outline

- Introduction
- Motivation/Privacy Threats
- **Enforcing Privacy in Online Services**
 - Using Intel SGX processors and P2P
 - Decentralized Proxy Service for Web Search
 - Edge-assisted Video Streaming
- Conclusion & Perspectives

SGX: Software Guard Extensions

- New instruction set since Intel Skylake processors (2015)
- Provides a protected environment called *enclave*
 - Memory encryption, integrity and freshness
 - Not even the OS or hypervisor are able to inspect
 - Suitable for using in hostile environments (cloud)



- Limitations:
 - Memory usage is limited to 128 MB per CPU



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Private Web search


- How can users protect their privacy from curious search engines?

1 Hiding identities (IP Address)

2 Making queries and user's interests indistinguishable


Unlinkability

Unlinkability between user and query (Tor)




Indistinguishability

Indistinguishability between real and fake queries (TrackMeNot)




Unlink. + Indisting.: PEAS




$E(m)$	RSA encryption of message m with the public key of the issuer
$\{m\}_i$	AES encryption of message m with key K_i
Q_i	i -th query of user U
K_i	AES encryption key associated with query Q_i
A_i	Answer to query Q_i
X	An anonymous identifier


Measuring Privacy



Measuring privacy



Measuring privacy







PEAS limitations

- Weak adversarial model
 - Relies on two non colluding servers
- Quality of fake queries
- Scalability

X-Search



Measuring privacy












X-Search Limitations

- Scalability
- Query limitation wrt search engine
- Accuracy


Cyclosa Architecture

- Every node in the system acts as a proxy node for others
- Use Intel SGX
- Built as a browser extension
- Considers query sensitivity





Measuring privacy







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Back to Video Streaming








Privacy Objectives

- Allow users to access video streams while enforcing delta-unlinkability
 - The probability of a user u being interested in a video v is at most equal to delta
- How?
 - Using TEEs to prevent information leakage (metadata server, the tracker, on the client side)
 - Protecting network traffic
 - Generating fake requests


Using Intel SGX



Protecting Against Insider Attacks



Using Fake Requests



Sum up

- Enforcing privacy in online services is important
 - 2 examples **Video Streaming** and **Web Search**
 - Many other examples: Recommender Systems, Location-based services, ...
 - P2P and secure hardware can help
 - More info: <https://liris.cnrs.fr/drim>